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ThE Will DECISION-
FREEDOM FOR STATES TO DISCRIMINATE?
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,
109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989)
1. INTRODUCTION
In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,1 the United States Supreme
Court resolved a split among the circuits over the question of whether a state may
be considered a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Will appears to return to the
restrictive view of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 expressed in Monroe v. Pape' abandoning the
broader approach of Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York. 4
Part I of this casenote will consider the facts of Will v. Michigan Department of
State Police. Part II will address the history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the history of
the Court's previous construction of "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Part III
will consider the instant case of Will v. Michigan Department of State Police. And,
Part IV will include an analysis of the Will decision and questions that the Will de-
cision may have left unanswered.
II. FACTS
Ray Eugene Will, an employee with the State of Michigan since 1969, sought
advancement to a position of data systems analyst with the State Police in late
1973.1 In spite of the facts that Will was ranked second on the promotional regis-
ter and the first ranked candidate withdrew, Will was not granted the position with
the State Police.6 Will later found that, when the Department of State Police ran a
preliminary check on him, information regarding Will's brother, a student activist,
was released. 7
Will filed a grievance with the Civil Service Commission asserting that the in-
formation concerning his brother had influenced the decision regarding his pro-
1. 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
2. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Ter-
ritory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
28 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
4. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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motion.8 Will's grievance with the Civil Service Commission was dismissed as
untimely.9 Will then filed suit in the Ingham Circuit Court against the Department
of Civil Service, the State Personnel Director, the Department of State Police, and
the Director of State Police.1" The defendants moved to remand for a grievance
hearing before the Civil Service Commission, and defendants' motion was granted
in June, 1978.11
Prior to the grievance hearing before the Civil Service Commission, the plain-
tiff filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims in November, 1978.12 His complaint
again included alleged violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13 The court of claims,
on May 7, 1979, denied defendants' summary judgment motion on plaintiff's sec-
tion 1983 claim but did grant plaintiffs motion for consolidation of the circuit
court and court of claims cases.14 The grievance hearing before an officer of the
Civil Service Commission resulted in a finding in plaintiffs favor.1" The decision
was affirmed by the Civil Service Commission in January, 1981.1" The state court
judge, rendering a decision for both the circuit court and the court of claims, held
that the plaintiff had "established a violation of the United States Constitution" and
that defendants "were persons for purposes of § 1983." 7
The Michigan Court of Appeals then vacated that part of the judgment finding
the Department of State Police a "person" under section 1983 and remanded the
case for a determination of the liability of the Director of State Police. 8 The
Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals, holding that the De-
partment of State Police was not a person under section 1983.19 Moreover, the
Michigan Supreme Court further held that the Director of State Police, while act-
ing in his official capacity, was not a "person" under section 1983.20
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine if a
state is a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.21
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 428 Mich. 540, 547 n. 1, 410 N.W2d 749, 752 n. 1 (1987). Will alleged that: (1) there was a denial of
due process of law under the United States and Michigan Constitutions by virtue of the Civil Service Commis-
sions's dismissal of his grievance; (2) there were violations under 28 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) the denial of promo-
tion because of his brother's political activities constituted a denial of due process. Id.
11. Id. at 547, 410 N.W.2d at 752.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 547-48, 410 N.W.2d at 752.
15. Id. at 548,410 N.W2d at 752. The hearing officer of the grievance proceeding "found that the state had
violated both Const. 1963, art. 11, § 5 (the civil service provision) and Civil Service Rule 1.2 in making its deci-
sion regarding Mr. Will's promotion on the basis of 'partisan considerations.' "Id.
16. Id.




21. 485 U.S. 1005 (1988).
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Congress, in 1871, enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act (also known as the Civil
Rights Act of 1871)22 in direct response to acts of violence and terrorism against
emancipated blacks.23 State and local officials often participated in these acts of
violence .24 The Ku Klux Klan Act was enacted under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment,25 which gave Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment through legislation.2 6 Section 1 of the Act, now 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, had three major purposes: (1) to override state laws which infringed upon
the privileges and rights of United States citizens; (2) to provide a remedy in the
event of inadequate state law; and (3) to provide the plaintiff with a federal remedy
where the theoretically adequate state remedy was in actuality not available.27
The major force behind the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was not that state remedies
for these acts of terrorism were unavailable but that the states had failed to enforce
the available laws evenly and equally. 28 "While one main scourge of the evil - per-
haps the leading one -was the Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created was not a rem-
edy against it or its members but against those who representing a State in some
capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law."
29
Because of restrictive judicial interpretation, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lay dormant
until 196130 when the Supreme Court issued its decision of Monroe v. Pape.31 In
Monroe the Court upheld the lower court's dismissal of the complaint against the
City of Chicago but reversed the dismissal against the city officials.32 The Su-
preme Court held in Monroe that Congress did not intend for municipalities to be
brought within the scope of section 1983."3 After a review of the legislative his-
tory of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Court based its conclusion regarding Con-
gressional intent upon the antagonistic response of Congress to the Sherman
22. P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 47 (1983) [hereinafter P. SCHUCK]. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
23. id.
24. Id.
25. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
26. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
27. Id. at 173-74.
28. Id. at 174-75.
29. Id. at 175-76.
30. Comment, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1135-36 (1977).
31. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The plaintiff in Monroe asserted that thirteen Chicago policemen forced their way
into his home and made him and his family stand naked in the living room while his house was ransacked by the
policemen. Id. Plaintiff was taken to the Chicago police station and for ten hours was detained and questioned
about a murder. Plaintiff was not allowed to telephone his family or an attorney. Plaintiff was subsequently re-
leased without any charges having been filed against him. Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Chicago and
against the police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil rights because the officers had
no search or arrest warrants. Id. at 169.
32. Id. at 192.
33. Id. at 187.
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Amendment, 4 a proposal which would have made "municipalities liable for cer-
tain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871,
S. ., The Sherman Amendment was adopted by the Senate as originally
proposed but was rejected by the House.3 ' A Conference Committee proposed an-
other version of the Amendment, but the House also rejected that Conference re-
port. 37  A second conference was held in which the Sherman Amendment was
dropped and what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1986 was substituted in its place. 38 This
substituted provision contained no mention of municipal liability under the Act.
39
However, because Monroe did uphold the plaintiffs right to sue the local offi-
cials (the Chicago Policemen),40 it established section 1983 as a "potent remedy
that citizens could invoke affirmatively against official misconduct without the
state's help or indeed in the face of its opposition. It swiftly became the legal
weapon of the ripening civil rights movement; only two years after the decision, §
1983 litigation had grown by over 60 percent."41 However, Monroe did deliver
bad news in that, if the individual local officials could not pay the judgment
against them, plaintiffs were without a federal remedy because the government it-
self (in this case, the City of Chicago) could not be sued under section 1983."
Between the years 1961 and 1978, a significant portion of the caseload of the fed-
eral courts was the result of federal civil rights litigation.43
In its next major interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court, in the
decision Monell v. Department of Social Services," expressly overruled Monroe
and its holding that local governments could not be sued under section 1983."4 In
reaching its holding, the Monell Court undertook a "fresh analysis" of the congres-
34. Id. at 191. The Sherman Amendment, as proposed, read:
. . . if such offense was committed to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his race,
color, or previous condition of servitude, in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish in
which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to person or persons
damnified by such offense if living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation
may be recovered by such person or his representative by a suit in any court of the United States of competent
jurisdiction in the district in which the offense was committed, to be in the name of the person injured, or his
legal representative, and against said county, city, or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment
rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any property, real or personal, of any person in said county, city,
or parish, and the said county, city or parish may recover the full amount of such judgment, costs and interest,
from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in such riot in an action in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., Ist Sess., p. 663, quoted in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 188 n.38 (1961).
35. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
36. Id. at 188.
37. Id. at 188-89.
38. Id. at 189-90.
39. Id. at 190.
40. Id. at 192.
41. P. SCHUCK, supra note 22, at 48.
42. Id.
43. Schapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979).
44. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
45. Id. at 663.
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sional debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1871 46 The Court noted that section 1
of the Act, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, received only limited discussion and debate
and was passed with no amendments.47 The great volume of congressional discus-
sion revolved around sections 2 through 4 of the Act.48
The Monell Court further noted that the Sherman Amendment was not an
amendment to section 1 of the Act, now section 1983, but was to be an addition to
section 7 of the Act.49 The debates relating to the Sherman Amendment, which
were relied upon by the Court in Monroe, show that the House of Representatives
refused to pass the Sherman Amendment, among others, and sent them to a con-
ference committee; however, section 1, presently section 1983, was not discussed
at the conference and "was passed verbatim as introduced in both Houses of Con-
gress. ""s
The Court in reaching its decision also relied on the express language of the
"Dictionary Act,"51 passed only several months before the Civil Rights Act of
1871.2 The Dictionary Act, the Court reasoned, which defined "person" as
"bodies politic and corporate," meant to include municipalities within the scope of
"person. "53 Further, because the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed after the
"Dictionary Act," municipalities were meant to be considered "persons" under
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1983)."'
The decision in Monell expressly held that local governing units could be sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the alleged action was an implementation or execu-
tion of an officially adopted regulation, policy, or decision by that governmental
unit's officers." In other words, an action under Monell could be maintained
against a local government under section 1983 when based upon an "execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy . "56
46. Id. at 665.
47. Id.
48. Sections 2 through 4 of the Act dealt with "suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in the Southern States. The
wisdom and constitutionality of these sections- not § 1, now § 1983 -were the subject of almost all congression-
al debate and each of these sections was amended." Monell, 436 U.S. at 665.
49. Id. at 666.
50. Id.
51. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2310 n.8. "The Dictionary Act provided that: 'in all acts hereafter passed ...the
word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that such
words were intended to be used in a more limited sense.' Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 ." Id.
52. Monell, 436 U.S. at 688.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 689.
55. Id. at 690. However, the Monell Court did hold that a municipality could not be held liable under the
theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 691.
56. Id. at 694.
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Some courts have extended Monell and have held that states and state agencies
are "persons" under section 1983."' For example, the United States District Court
for Wyoming, in Atchison v. Nelson,s8 held that it would be inconsistent to hold
that municipalities are to be considered "persons" under section 1983 but that
states and agencies of the state are not to be considered "persons" under the stat-
ute. 59
However, the Monell Court did restrict its holding to "local government units
which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. '60 It
was this specific restriction which led to the Supreme Court's holding in Quern v.
Jordan.61 The Court in Quern addressed the status of a state's eleventh amendment
immunity62 in light of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and concluded that Congress did not in-
tend to override the state's eleventh amendment immunity.63 The Court based its
holding on the general language of section 198364 and on the fact that there was
little or no debate on section 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act when it was passed.65
Surely, the Court reasoned, if Congress had meant to abrogate something as im-
portant as eleventh amendment immunity, there would have been lengthy debate
on the subject.66
The importance of the eleventh amendment is that it immunizes states from
suits by private citizens who seek to impose a liability which would ultimately be
paid out of the state treasury.67 In Owen v. City of independence68 the United States
Supreme Court held that the idea of common-law immunities was so firmly en-
trenched in tradition that Congress would have specifically provided for its abro-
gation if it had so intended.69 In order for Congress to abrogate the eleventh
amendment, it must do so through specific, unmistakable language in the Act it-
self.7"
57. See Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 612 F.2d 160, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1034 (1980) (holding that a state university is a "person" under § 1983, relying on Monell); Morrow v.
Sudler, 502 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (D. Colo. 1980) (holding that a state historical society is a state agency and a
state educational institution and is considered a "person" under § 1983).
58. 460 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Wyo. 1978).
59. Id. at 1107.
60. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54.
61. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
62. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
63. Quern, 440 U.S. at 341.
64. Id. at 345.
65. Id. at 343.
66. Id.
67. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,663 (1974).
68.445 U.S. 622 (1980).
69. Id. at 637.
70. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987).
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The United States Supreme Court explained the need for requiring specific lan-
guage in the statute itself in the case of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.71 The
Court stated as follows:
Congress' power to abrogate a State's immunity means that in certain circum-
stances the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment does not obtain. "Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate
legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitution-
ally impermissible in other contexts." Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S., [sic] at 456. In view
of this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress' intent
before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment.
The requirement that Congress unequivocally express this intention in the statutory
language ensures such certainty.
72
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau
of Revenue7' explained the difference between eleventh amendment immunity and
state sovereign immunity. Both concepts were designed to protect state govern-
ment. The eleventh amendment protects states from interference by the federal
courts. Sovereign immunity protects states from intrusion by plaintiffs in state
courts .7 The court in Ramah pointed out that Quern's holding only addressed a
state's eleventh amendment immunity.75 However, the court went on to state that it
"logically follows that Congress also did not intend, in adopting Section 1983, to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from Section 1983 suits brought in state
courts, 76 thereby extending Quern's holding to section 1983 actions filed in state
courts.
Some courts have enlarged Quern further to a holding that totally exempts states
from suit under section 1983, whether in state or federal court, by holding that
71. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
72. Id. at 242-43.
73. 104 N.W. 302, 720 P.2d 1243 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
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states are never "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." For example, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Ohio, in Bailey v. Ohio State Uni-
versity,78 held that because "Congress did not intend to abrogate eleventh amend-
ment immunity for the states means, necessarily, that a state is not a 'person' under
§ 1983 and no suit for any relief may be maintained against the state under §
1983."'9
Meanwhile, other courts have limited Quern to its specific holding that section
1983 does not abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity." The First Cir-
cuit, in Della Grotta v. State of Rhode Island,81 construed the holding in Quern nar-
rowly and held that the State of Rhode Island was a "person" under section 1983
and could be sued because Rhode Island had waived its eleventh amendment im-
munity.82 The First Circuit stated:
While the Court expressly limited its holding in Monell to 'local governmental units
which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,' we
see nothing in Monell to suggest that, apart from eleventh amendment consider-
ations, a state should be viewed differently from other bodies politic. Where, as
here, a state has waived its eleventh amendment immunity, there is no principled
reason to distinguish between states and municipalities as 'persons' suable under sec-
tion 1983.83
77. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1137 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983) (holding
that neither state agencies nor states are considered "persons" within § 1983); Holladay v. State, 506 F. Supp.
1317, 1321 (D. Mont. 1981) (holding that the State of Montana cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a
"person" under the statute); Thompson v. State, 487 F. Supp. 212, 226 (N.D.N. Y. 1979) (holding that, in light of
Quern, the State of New York is not a"person" under § 1983 and cannot be sued thereunder); State v. Green, 633
P.2d 1381, 1382 (Alaska 1981) (interpreting Quern as holding that a state is not a "person" under § 1983); St.
Mary's Hosp. v. State, 150 Ariz. 8, 11,721 P.2d 666, 669 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)(holding the State of Arizona is
not a "person" under § 1983 by virtue of Quem); Merritt v. State, 108 Idaho 20, 26, 696 P.2d 871, 877 (1985)
(interpreting Quern to hold that states are not considered "persons" under § 1983); Bird v. State, 375 N.W.2d 36,
43 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a § 1983 claim is barred against a state); Shaw v. City of St. Louis, 664
S.W.2d 572, 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 849 (1984) (holding that a state is not a "person"
under § 1983); Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 324, 537 A.2d 652, 654 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 75
(1988) ("[l~f a governmental entity enjoys immunity as the state or its alter ego under the eleventh amendment, it
cannot be liable as a 'person' under § 1983."); Burkey v. Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, 38 Ohio App. 3d
170, 171, 528 N.E.2d 607,608 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding a state is not a "person" under § 1983 and, there-
fore, suit cannot be maintained under § 1983); Gay v. State, 730 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
the State of Texas is not a "person" under § 1983, and "a suit based upon that statute could not be maintained even
in the state courts"); Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 221, 595 P.2d 534, 537 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1077 (1980) (holding that Quern held that the word "person" in § 1983 was clearly not intended to include states);
Boldt v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 566, 584, 305 N.W.2d 133, 143-44 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 973 (1981) (hold-
ing a state is not considered a "person" under § 1983).
78. 487 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
79. Id. at 603.
80. Hodges v. Tomberlin, 510 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (S.D. Ga. 1980) ("It is clear from Quern that a state may
be subject to monetary as well as injunctive relief where it has waived immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment."); Marrapese v. State, 500 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 (D. R.I. 1980) ("Quern concluded only that the Congress
which enacted § 1983 did not intend to force the states to answer in federal court for their constitutional viola-
tions."); Hill v. Department of Corrections, 513 So. 2d 129, 132 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1024
(1988) ("[lI]t is also necessary to consider whether there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity.").
81. 781 F.2d 343 (lst Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 349.
83. Della Grotta, 781 F.2d at 349 (citations omitted) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978)).
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In Gumbhir v. Kansas State Board of Pharmacy,84 the Supreme Court of Kansas
held that, after a careful reading of Quern, it was evident that Quern did not hold
that state agencies or states could never be held to be "persons" under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, only that eleventh amendment immunity may apply to the action.85
This conflict between various courts and their interpretations of "person" under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is what the Supreme Court sought to resolve with the decision of
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police. 8
6
IV. INSTANT CASE
Justice White delivered the majority opinion in Will87 and articulated the issue
as being whether a state, or a state official acting within his official capacity, is to
be considered a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.88 The Supreme Court noted
that the lower court's holding that the State of Michigan was not a "person" under
section 1983 conflicts with several state and federal court cases which have held
that states are "persons" under section 1983 .8 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in order to resolve the conflict.9" The Court acknowledged that it had never
expressly dealt with the issue of whether a state is a "person" under section 1983.91
The Court took note of the fact that many courts had construed Quern v. Jor-
dan92 as holding that a state is not a "person" under section 1983."3 However, the
Supreme Court pointed out that Quern only held that section 1983 was not an ab-
rogation of a state's eleventh amendment immunity.9 4 Because Will was filed in a
Michigan state court, the eleventh amendment clearly did not apply; and the issue
of whether a state is a "person" under section 1983 was placed squarely before the
Supreme Court.9 '
The Court in Will explicitly held that a state is not considered a "person" under
section 1983.98 This decision was based upon the Court's determination that, in
common usage, "person" is not construed to include states or sovereign govern-
ments, and statutes which include the word "person" are usually construed to ex-
clude states from their meaning. 97 Dissenting, Justice Brennan asserted that this
84. 231 Kan. 507,646 P.2d 1078 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983).
85. Id. at 513,646 P.2d at 1084.
86. Will, 109S. Ct. at 2307.
87. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2305 (1989). White, J., delivered the opinion of
the Court in which Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Id. Brennan, J., filed a
dissenting opinion in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., also filed a dissenting
opinion. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2306.
90. Id. at 2307.
91. Id.
92. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
93. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2307.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2308.
97. Id.
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interpretive rule relied upon by the majority was merely an aid to construction of a
statute and that the legislative history, the subject matter, and the executive inter-
pretation of the statute are also to be considered.98
The Supreme Court next relied upon its major argument in Quern v. Jordan that
had Congress intended to change the balance between the federal and state govern-
ments, it would have done so expressly in the statute itself.99 This requirement of
express language ensures that Congress has intended to call into issue the matter
being decided by the judiciary."' Congress, according to the Court, had no inten-
tion, when enacting section 1983, of altering the eleventh amendment immunity
enjoyed by the states. 1 '
In addressing plaintiffs argument regarding the applicability of section 1983 to
a state court action, the Court held that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity
was also a well-established doctrine at common law.'0 2 Once again, because of no
express language in the statute so indicating, Congress was held not to have in-
tended to override such a well-established and familiar doctrine." 3 In putting to
rest the plaintiffs argument on this point, the Court stated:
Given that a principal purpose behind the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a fed-
eral forum for civil rights claims, and that Congress did not provide such a federal
forum for civil rights claims against States, [by virtue of the eleventh amendment]
we cannot accept petitioner's argument that Congress intended nevertheless to create
a cause of action against States to be brought in state courts, which are precisely the
courts Congress sought to allow civil rights claimants to avoid through § 1983.04
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with this reverse reason-
ing by the Court and noted that this clear-statement principle is applicable only to
eleventh amendment interpretational cases. 0 Since Will was a suit filed in state
court, Brennan argued, the eleventh amendment and, therefore, the clear-state-
ment principle had no application to Will, and Quern 's conclusion was irrelevant to
the question addressed in Will.'0 6
The plaintiff also contended the Congressional debates regarding what is pre-
sently section 1983 indicate Congress intended the statute "to extend to the full
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment" and to supply a remedy for all types of gov-
ernmental violations of rights of federal protection.0 7 Plaintiffs argument was
based on the passages of debate evidencing that the passage of section 1983 was
motivated by failure of the states to appropriately remedy the violation of rights
98. Id. at 2312-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2309.
100. Id. at 2308-09.




105. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2314-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2310.
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occurring at that time.1"8 The Court, in briefly reviewing the history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, did not agree with the plaintiff and held again that Congress'
intention to create a cause of action against a state was not clear and there was
nothing in the debates to evidence such an intent on the part of Congress. 109
Next, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Dictionary Act, 10 under
which "person" was to mean in all acts thereafter passed "bodies politic and corpo-
rate," was applicable to section 1983.11 This meaning of "person," plaintiff ar-
gued, was meant to include state governments; and because section 1983 was
passed after the Dictionary Act, plaintiff reasoned that this meaning of "person"
applied. 1 2 The Court, however, held that the Dictionary Act was inapplicable to
section 1983 because section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, upon which section
1 of the 1871 Act was based (presently section 1983), was passed before the Dic-
tionary Act was enacted. 11 Moreover, the Court reasoned that in 1871 the phrase
"bodies politic and corporate" was construed as meaning both private and public
corporations but was not construed to include states. 14 However, Justice Brennan
countered that "[b]oth before and after the time when the Dictionary Act and §
1983 were passed, the phrase 'bodies politic and corporate' was understood to in-
clude the States." 
15
The Court next considered the effect of its holding in Monel1 18 on the instant
case. Distinguishing Moneil from the instant case, the Court held, that states gain
protection from eleventh amendment immunity while municipalities do not. 17
Also, the Court in Monell had expressly limited its decision "to local government
units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment pur-
poses."1 18
Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that officials of the State of Michigan should
be considered "persons" under 42 U. S.C. § 1983. 119 The Court dismissed this ar-
gument by holding that a suit against an official of the state in his official capacity
is, in actuality, a suit against that official's office and is, therefore, "no different
from a suit against the State itself.1l20 The Court did make an exception to this par-
ticular holding by noting that if suit is for injunctive relief and not for monetary
relief, the state official is considered a "person" under section 1983.21
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
111. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, quoted in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304,
2310 n.81 (1989).
112. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2310.
113. Id.
114. Id. at2311.
115. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2315 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
117. Will, 109S. Ct. at 2311.
118. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54.
119. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2311.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2311-12 n.10.
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, the Supreme Court resolved the
question of whether a state is ever to be considered a "person" under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The Court concluded that in all cases, whether actions in state or federal
court, a state is not a "person" under the statute. 122 In so restricting the scope of
section 1983, the Court has seemingly circumvented the true and original purpose
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 from which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 originated.
Congress in enacting section 1983 sought to create a federal remedy by which to
enforce the fourteenth amendment "against those who carry a badge of authority of
a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their
authority or misuse it. "123 There was much oppression in the United States at that
time involving recently emancipated blacks. The author of section 1 of the four-
teenth amendment, Representative Bingham, during the debates regarding what is
presently section 1983, stated as follows:
The States never had the right, though they had the power, to inflict wrongs upon
free citizens by a denial of the full protection of the laws . . . [and] the States did
deny to citizens the equal protection of the laws, they did deny the rights of citizens
under the Constitution, and except to the extent of the express limitations upon the
States, as I have shown, the citizen had no remedy . . . . They took property with-
out compensation, and he had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of the press,
and he had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of speech, and he had no rem-
edy. They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no remedy .... Who
dare say, now that the Constitution has been amended, that the nation cannot by law
provide against all such abuses and denials of right as these in the States and by
States, or combinations of persons?124
It is apparent from this excerpt from the debates surrounding the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 that one main purpose of the Act was to give plaintiffs,
whose constitutional rights had been violated, a forum against those who had ig-
nored or violated their civil rights. These violators were often state officials or
state personnel who simply refused to enforce the law. 2 ' Section 1983 "was in-
tended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official
violation of federally protected rights."' 26 Does this "broad construction" not ex-
tend to actions against states? It would appear to offend the intentions of the draft-
ers of section 1983 and those who enacted it to exclude from possible liability the
most powerful entities which "pose the greatest threat to the constitutional rights
of citizens ... 127
122. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2312.
123. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
124. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., I st Sess. App. 815 (1871), quoted in Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 685 n.45 (1978).
125. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,20 (1980).
126. Monel, 436 U.S. at 700-01.
127. Marrapese v. State, 500 F. Supp. 1207, 1212 (D.R.I. 1980).
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Congress may, by virtue of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, enact legis-
lation which serves the purpose of enforcing the fourteenth amendment. This leg-
islation may allow private suits against officials of a state or against the state
itself.128 Section 1983 is an example of such legislation enacted for the purpose of
enforcing the fourteenth amendment. 129 The Court has acknowledged that section
5 of the fourteenth amendment may limit the eleventh amendment and the concept
of state sovereign immunity.130 However, this intention to remove or override a
state's eleventh amendment immunity must be explicit, and, as held in Quern v.
Jordan, Congress' language in section 1983 was not explicit enough. 
131
After the Court's holding in Quern, courts interpreted the status of a state under
section 1983 in two different ways: (1) some courts held that a state's eleventh
amendment immunity was left intact after section 1983, but that suit against a
state was still possible if said immunity was waived;3 2 (2) some courts found im-
plied in Quern the holding that a state is never a "person" under section 1983.133 It
is the latter interpretation which the Will Court adopted.
The Court reasoned that, because the eleventh amendment immunity was not
expressly abrogated by section 1983, the concept of state sovereign immunity pro-
tecting states from suit in their own courts was also left intact. 134 Justice Brennan,
dissenting, stated:
[T]he answer to the question whether § 1983 provides a federal forum for suits
against the States may be, and most often will be different from the answer to the
kind of question before us today. Since the question whether Congress has provided
a federal forum for damages suits against the States is answered by applying a
uniquely strict interpretive principle [in relation to eleventh amendment abrogation],
... the Court should not pretend that we have, in Quern, answered the question
whether Congress intended to provide a federal forum for such suits, and then reason
backwards from that 'intent' to the conclusion that Congress must not have intended
to allow such suits to proceed in state court. 1
35
This holding by the Court that a state is never a "person" under section 1983
ignores the power of Congress to enact legislation for the purpose of enforcing the
fourteenth amendment and precludes an action by the plaintiff even in the event
that the state has consented to suit or waived its immunity.' 36 Although a waiver by
a state of its eleventh amendment immunity will be found only through express
language or by implications which leave no room for doubting the state's intention
128. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
129. See supra notes 24-25. Section 1983 was originally § 1 of "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and For other Purposes." Jett v. Dallas Indep. School
Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2715 (1989).
130. See supra notes 24-25.
131. 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979).
132. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
134. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2309.
135. Id. at 2315.
136. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 474 (1987).
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to waive the immunity,137 states have been held in the past to have so waived their
immunity;1 38 and a plaintiff should not be foreclosed from pursuing that avenue of
recovery. Had the Court in Will limited its holding to a recognition of a state's sov-
ereign immunity and/or eleventh amendment immunity in the face of a section
1983 action, it would have allowed plaintiffs whose civil rights had been violated
the "largest possibility for redress." 139  The Court, had it so held, would have left
open to plaintiffs the possibility of pursuing an action against a state under section
1983.
The Will decision is but one example of the Court's shift toward a "literalist
reading of statutory terms as a surrogate for actual legislative intent." 140 The Court
portrays itself to be bound by the express terms of congressional enactments,
thereby failing to address the true issues placed before the Court. 1 4  The most ap-
parent weakness in the Court's clear-statement approach is that it thrusts upon
Congress the unrealistic responsibility of constantly updating the law.142 Con-
gress, in enacting a piece of legislation, cannot foresee all of the problems which
may arise, nor can words be counted upon to "fully capture congressional mean-
ing."1 43 This clear-statement approach removes from the Court the opportunity to
measure and test Congress' expressed purposes in enacting a statute with the ac-
tual statutory outcomes. In using this approach the Court's actions often amount
to little more than a rubber-stamping of, what are at times, unjust statutory
results.1
Another argument against the recognition of states as "persons" under section
1983 has been what some have seen as the possible extension of liability and finan-
cial responsibility to states and local governments for violations under section
137. Id. at 473.
138. See, e.g., Della Grotta v. State, 781 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1986); Marrapese v. State, 500 F. Supp. 1207
(D.R.I. 1980); Ramah Navajo School Bd. Bureau of Revenue, 104 N.M. 302, 720 P.2d 1243 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986).
139. Marrapese, 500 F. Supp. at 1212.
140. Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95
HARV. L. REV. 892, 894 (1982).
141. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989). InJet a white former head football
coach and athletic director brought an action alleging discrimination in his job reassignment under 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 1983 against the public school district and the black principal. Id. at 2703. The Court held that a mu-
nicipality could not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory for violations of its employees under § 1981.
Id. at 2704. The Court, in reaching this conclusion, held that the damages remedy provided under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 constitutes the "exclusive federal remedy" for rights found to have been violated by state governmental units
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at 2721. The Court once again relied upon its clear-statement principle and held
"whatever the limits of the judicial power to imply or create remedies, it has long been the law that such power
should not be exercised in the face of an express decision by Congress concerning the scope of remedies available
under a particular statute."Id. at 2720. See also Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). In Martin the Supreme
Court relied on the express language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 in holding that intervention is cast in
permissive terms. Id. at 2185. Therefore, white firefighters who failed to intervene in a previous employment
discrimination action were not bound by consent decrees entered pursuant to that action, even though notice of
the hearings was published and the Birmingham Firefighters Association and two of its members had moved to
intervene in that action. Id. at 2183.
142. See Note, supra note 140, at 905.
143. See Note, supra note 140, at 899.
144. See Note, supra note 140, at 906-07.
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1983.145 The fear has been that all taxpayers will, in the end, be penalized for the
deeds of their government officials and the government itself.'46 But, as pointed
out in Owen v. City of Independence,"47 the general public enjoys the fruits of the
governmental activities; and it is the ultimate responsibility of the public to see
that governmental activity is properly conducted." "[I]t is fairer to allocate any
resulting financial loss to the inevitable costs of government borne by all the tax-
payers, than to allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose rights . . . have
been violated." 49 A provision of damages either ensures or deters a certain activ-
ity. 15 0 Although the Court in Owen was addressing the imposition of fines against a
municipality, the same arguments apply to state liability. The knowledge that
damages might be imposed would create incentive for the state officials to ensure
that its citizens' civil rights are upheld and protected. It would encourage states to
create and put into practice internal policies and procedures to ensure that consti-
tutional rights are not violated. In the end, it seems only fair that the one causing
the injury should pay for any damage incurred thereby. 51
This argument regarding the financial burden to be placed on the government
no longer has credence in the face of Monell. The allowance of damages against a
municipality supported by taxpayers is no different from imposing damages
against a state which is likewise supported by taxpayers. Moreover, the right to
pursue an action against a state under section 1983 for alleged violation of civil
rights seems even more important in light of the fact that it is the state that is
charged with the responsibility of protecting those civil rights."5 2
Another major purpose of section 1983 was the prevention of future depriva-
tions and abuses of citizens' constitutional rights. 53 Since the states were the ones
failing to recognize their citizens' constitutional rights, as shown through the legis-
lative history of the Act, it seems evident that section 1983 was enacted to prevent
and deter future deprivations by the states themselves. This purpose may still be
accomplished after Will through suit against a state official for injunctive or pro-
spective relief."'s This remedy would appear to appease those who opposed the
Act because it might financially burden a state.' However, by denying action di-
rectly against a state, but allowing action against state officials acting in their offi-
cial capacities in certain situations, the Court has succeeded in formulating a
series of hoops through which a plaintiff mustjump before being able to ensure that
a state will not violate his constitutional rights. The plaintiff must first name a
145. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 265-66 (1981).
146. Id.
147. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
148. Id. at 655.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 651-52.
151. Id. at 654.
152. Id. at 651.
153. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 268.
154. Will, 109 S. Ct. at2311 n.10.
155. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
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state official, allege that he acted within his official capacity, and then seek an in-
junction or prospective relief. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion in Atas-
cadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,1"6 pointed out the weaknesses in this procedure.
These intricate rules often create manifest injustices while failing to respond to any
legitimate needs of the States. A damages award may often be the only practical
remedy available to the plaintiff, and the threat of a damages award may be the only
effective deterrent to a defendant's willful violation of federal law.
157
If prospective or injunctive relief can be awarded in the instance of suit against
officials of the state, and, as the majority in Will stated, "[a]s such, it is no differ-
ent from a suit against the State itself,"158 then it follows that a state is a "person"
under section 1983 in such actions." 9 The Court has, whether it realized it or not,
acknowledged that suit against the state is permitted when the correct relief is
sought.
The end result of the Will decision is to leave the plaintiff whose civil rights have
been violated with only one remedy under section 1983: to file suit against a state
official acting in his official capacity but only for prospective injunctive relief.
The plaintiff whose damage has already occurred, as was the case in Will, or the
plaintiff who will not benefit from prospective injunctive relief is effectively fore-
closed from any avenue of recovery under section 1983. This result falls far short
of the original intent of section 1983 and of what its supporters sought to achieve
by enacting it. The Supreme Court stated it best in Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence: 
160
How 'uniquely amiss' it would be, therefore, if the government itself-'the social or-
gan to which all in our society look for the promotion of liberty, justice, fair and
equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for social conduct'-
were permitted to disavow liability for the injury it has begotten. 
161
Kathleen L. Hughes
156. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
157. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. 234, 256-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Atascadero the Supreme
Court held that Congress in enacting the Rehabilitation Act, had not abrogated the states' eleventh amendment
immunity because there was not a clear-statement of intent to so abrogate. Id. at 246. Justice Brennan, dissent-
ing, stated that the rules of statutory drafting relied upon by the majority did little to determine the actual intent of
Congress and served as a hurdle used to keep disfavored actions outside the federal courts. Id. at 254. The prin-
ciple also acted as an obstruction to the will of Congress. Id. at 255 n.7.
158. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2311.
159. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160.445 U.S. 622 (1980). The Court in Owen recognized a § 1983 action against a municipality but held that
eleventh amendment immunity forecloses suit against a state unless waived.
161. Id. at 651 (quoting Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970)).
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